![docker run as root docker run as root](https://blog.gougousis.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/uid.png)
![docker run as root docker run as root](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/hardeningdockerdaemonwithrootlessmode-190501210234/95/dockercon-2019-hardening-docker-daemon-with-rootless-mode-11-638.jpg)
If file capabilities are supported (i.e., since Linux 2.6.24): add any capability from the calling thread's bounding set to its inheritable set drop capabilities from the bounding set make changes to the secure bits flags. Make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary GID list Use RAW and PACKET sockets and binds to any address for transparent proxying Will not clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID mode bits even when a file is changedīypass permission checks for sending signalsīind a socket to internet domain privileged ports (port numbers below 1024) Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs change the owner and group of files, directories, and linksĬAP_DAC_OVERRIDE (Discretionary access control)īypass a file’s read, write, and execute permission checksīypass permission checks on operations that normally require the file system UID of the process to match the UID of the file, excluding checks which are covered by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH Write records to the kernel’s auditing log Since Docker containers run on top of a Linux environment, resource isolation features of the Linux kernel are used for them to run independently. To be able to isolate multiple processes running inside a single host, the container engine uses various kernel features. Keeping containers isolatedĪ container, which contains an application’s fundamental components, is essentially an isolated environment.
Docker run as root code#
Because an attacker has root access, malicious code or coin miners can be executed and effectively hidden.
Docker run as root software#
They can also exploit container software vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, such as containers with weak credentials or no authentication. Attackers can identify software running on the host to find and exploit vulnerabilities.
![docker run as root docker run as root](https://i.stack.imgur.com/vmlU8.png)
It’s notable to mention that other isolation techniques such as cgroups, AppArmor, and SECcomp are renounced or disabled.įor malicious actors who gain access to exposed privileged containers, the possibilities for abuse are seemingly endless.
Docker run as root full#
This implies that an attacker will be able to run full host root with all of the available capabilities, including CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
![docker run as root docker run as root](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/fp2AMLq4O04/hqdefault.jpg)
As the privileged container is spawned because of the need for enhanced permissions, there is a large chance that an attacker will be able to run code as root. But when they do execute code, the potential attack surface is wide. When an attacker abuses a privileged container for an attack, it does not necessarily entail remote code execution. Running a container with privileged flag allows internal teams to have critical access to the host’s resources - but by abusing a privileged container, cybercriminals can gain access to them as well. However, there are some serious implications to using privileged containers without securing them. Generally, Docker-in-Docker is used when there is a need to spawn another container while running an existing container. In this blog post, we will explore how running a privileged yet unsecure container may allow cybercriminals to gain a backdoor in an organization’s system. However, running privileged containers are not necessarily secure. Today, there are various use cases for running privileged containers, such as automating continuous integration and delivery (CI/CD) tasks in the open-source automation server Jenkins. Originally, Docker-in-Docker was introduced for the development of Docker itself. One use case of a privileged container is running a Docker daemon inside a Docker container another is where the container requires direct hardware access. Privileged containers in Docker are, concisely put, containers that have all of the root capabilities of a host machine, allowing the ability to access resources which are not accessible in ordinary containers.